



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

facts may be variously estimated but they must not be ignored. The reader of Professor Nicholson's book would not guess that trusts had ever existed, or that the maintenance of real freedom of contract was difficult or doubtful. I must insist that those who ignore such things or hold traditional conclusions unmodified by them are no kindred of Adam Smith. Nor is it enough grudgingly to admit the beneficence of the factory acts, and deny that the State can be useful farther. History is worthless if it does not enable us to project the orbit of progress into the future. Doubtless State intervention has its dangers and its limits, but limits shift and difficulties that once baffled, here as elsewhere, are later overcome.

Concession after concession, qualification after qualification, has sapped the vitality of the doctrine of *laissez faire*. It lacks the vigorous conviction, the conscious obviousness and the confident appeal to current experience which characterized the writings of Adam Smith. Even its calmest advocates can hardly refrain from epithets and spleen. All signs indicate a readiness for a new prophet, a new Adam Smith, who shall interpret to us the signs of our times.

H. H. POWERS.

Wesen und Zweck der Politik, als Theil der Sociologie und Grundlage der Staatswissenschaften. Von GUSTAV RATZENHOFFER. 3 vols. Pp. 400, 363 and 481. Price 20 m. Leipzig: Bockhaus, 1893.

The question whether history is a science has always been much less a matter of controversy than the question whether politics, while apparently only political shrewdness or skill in State affairs, can be a science. Politics has been regarded as synonymous with statecraft, and this view has been strengthened by the fact that every attempt to treat politics as a science has failed. There have been such attempts made, though they have, as Robert von Mohl declares, all "stopped with modest demands." Mohl, himself, in his "*Cyclopädie der Staatswissenschaften*," presents a brief outline of politics in the sense of "statecraft," or the "theory of the appropriate means to the attainment of the various purposes of the State." Holtzendorf, likewise, has written a book on the "*Prinzipien der Politik*," in which he essays to set forth the scientifically established laws of political action. But both Mohl and Holtzendorf forget that science affords no guide for action, that science must not be confounded with art. The function of science is to present the objective development of phenomena and the laws of this development; and a science of politics, therefore, should set forth the political actions of men as a social phenomenon having a regular development. There has been no such presentation

to the present time for the simple reason that so long as the State is regarded as the work of man's free will, and all political action as man's "free deed," there can be no science of politics.

It was only when sociology conceived the state to be the natural and necessary product of the elementary forces dominant in heterogeneous groups, when the state came to be regarded as a natural phenomenon,* that the further question, according to what laws have the activities of these social elements developed in this natural product, could become a subject for scientific investigation. Thus a scientific treatment of politics could rest only upon the basis of sociology. Gustav Ratzenhofer is the first to attempt such a treatment, and to carry it out in a really ingenious manner. We believe we do not err in asserting that Ratzenhofer's name will from now on be associated with those of the greatest authors of the past, Machiavelli, Comte and Spencer; but with this difference, however, that what were unsuccessful attempts on their part, have been changed by him into success.

After summarizing the sociological theories in the introduction, the author devotes the first two volumes to the "*Wesen der Politik*." He accepts as the most important fundamental fact of sociology "the presence of numerous distinct but intercommingling races, a fact which, for one thing, excludes as scientifically unusable the [theory of the] descent of mankind from a single pair." In the four large divisions of these first two volumes he discusses: I, Politics (*im allgemeinen*); II, National (or Home) Politics; III, Foreign Politics; IV, Social Policy (*Gesellschaftspolitik*). The author understands politics to be the activity of a social community in its own interest. Sociologists also use the term "group" instead of community, and the author often employs the expression "political individualities."† Every body of men having common interests forms such an "individuality" but it is often the case that a single person, such as a statesman or a ruler, is himself a "political individuality."

"Politics (*im allgemeinen*) grows out of the inter-relations of coming in contact with one another. The political person (*i. e.*, generally the group, the class, the society) exists because of common descent, like occupation;" similar conditions as to amount of wealth owned, and often because of a common language, religion, civilization, etc. The author takes the position of an outside observer in the midst of these "political persons" (groups, classes, etc.) whom he sees having

* On this sociological theory, consult: Gumplowicz, "*Der Rassen Kampf*," Innsbruck, 1882, and "*Grundriss der Sociologie*," Wien, 1885.

† [*"Individualitäten."*] It is perhaps best to translate "*politische Individualitäten*" and "*politische Personlichkeiten*" as political individuals and political persons.—EDITOR].

contact with each other, struggling each against the other, or agreeing upon compromises, and investigates the motives of their action, the methods of their practices, the aims they seek to obtain by these practices and the conditions which render more difficult or more easy the attainment of these purposes. In this manner Ratzenhofer has succeeded in making politics a science, just as Adam Smith was able to raise political economy to such a rank because he simply observed the economic phenomena and stated their vital principles and their conformity to laws.

Of course, when an observer takes such an objective unpartisan standpoint, we cannot expect him to palliate events; and thus the presentation given by Ratzenhofer will wound many a sensitive nature. However, the blame lies not with the scientific investigator, who states the truth first of all, but rather with the regardlessness and egotistic action of the "political individuals." We can no more reproach Ratzenhofer because the "political persons" carry on a life and death struggle that they may thereby pursue purely selfish aims and employ every means that will secure to them these aims, than we can censure Adam Smith because of his economic motive, "self-interest," or Darwin because of the "struggle for existence" which he observed and investigated. Ratzenhofer is only the faithful delineator of the things which the actual facts bring within observation. Furthermore, he gives us cheerful prospects of "civilizing" politics in which nobler motives dominate, and the "barbarous" politics are held in check. Far be it from him, however, to set up, as political writers often do, moral rules for political action, with the demand that they shall be observed by contending parties, nor has he any thought of writing a code of State morals ("*Staatsmoral*"), as Mohl once desired to do. To be sure, he often gives counsel and introduces rules of action, but these concern only the fitness of particular operations. When he does thus give his counsel, it is such that it can be put into practice equally well by the representative of the nobility, the church, the laborers or the farmers, he gives only rules for action deduced from the experience of political conflicts.

This struggle of "political persons" is subject to the "law of absolute enmity." "*Diese absolute Feindseligkeit*" is the essential characteristic of all politics. However, the purpose of all politics is success—success in the struggle to satisfy the self-interests of the political individual. Such interests are numerous; the source from which they all flow is the care for existence. "Men have a strong desire to raise themselves out of the lowlands of material cares, a desire which continually increases with growing culture." Besides these material motives, there are, of course, intellectual and moral

ones, but these are only the branches on the trunk of the material motives. According to the position of the individual, or the "political persons," does the one or do the other of these motives have preponderance in determining political action; but "the mass of persons must be ruled by material motives under all circumstances." This does not prevent these same masses, and often their leaders, from holding before themselves various other motives, such as love of country, justice, etc.

We see that the author is extremely realistic in his presentation, but he justly observes that "investigations concerning the character of politics demand a ruthless striving after truth." (I, 59). Consequently, the author does not hesitate to tell men, as political beings, the full and unmixed truth, and to hold before them, as such, a mirror in which every lover of truth, must plainly recognize that which he loves.

"If we wish to know the causes of political conflict," he says, "we must entirely disregard every moral struggle." . . . "The animal part of our race contains the true causes of the struggle for existence." (I, 126). Since "nourishment and the increase of the race are dependent upon the area which is at the disposal of the single individual and of the race, it follows that the gaining of territory is the object of every political conflict;" all other objects, as for example, slaves, capital, advantages in trade, are only means "by which men make the produce of a given area and the advantages of space" serviceable (I, 127).

The most primitive political persons that carry on political conflict are primitive hordes; development leads to the tribe, state and nation; these are the more advanced political persons. The character of the political struggle remains the same; its forms alone change according to the proportion of this development. These few sentences are given merely to afford the reader an idea of the character of Ratzenhofer's work. It would take us too long to give even an approximate résumé of its rich contents.

Passing from the "Character of Politics (*im allgemeinen*)" to "National Politics," the author portrays the parties in the state, sets forth the "leading" of the same, and describes the statesman, the agitator and demagogue. He brings out characteristic instantaneous photographs of these types. Likewise the chapters in which he brings before us the stages of political operations are incomparably masterly. From these chapters, politicians of all parties; ministers of state as well as leaders of workingmen may learn much.

After national politics "foreign politics" are treated. Here the states form the contending units and thus the political persons. The

objects of foreign politics are: "The increase and maintenance of the national territory and the advantages of trade." This kind of politics does not serve party advantage, but the interest of the state, which interest the author defines as the "common will of the social structure." The author examines the conditions upon which the political power of the state abroad depends. Among these conditions are good natural boundaries. "The destruction of the State of Poland is a classical example of the disadvantage of defective natural boundaries" (II, 39). The chapters concerning the defence of the state (a subject upon which the author wrote a very good book eleven years ago), are excellent.

After devoting several chapters to the foreign political operations of the state, the author ends this division of his work with a glance at "world politics" (or the policy of colonization). Here he very justly remarks that the interests of culture, which in Europe restrain absolute hostility or wars, necessitate the extension of dominion outside of Europe (II, 243). Because of this the European States have entered upon their colonial policy and the "struggle for possessions and influence outside of Europe." In this foreign arena of conflict the "struggle between Russia and England for world dominion stands in the foreground." The author thinks that this conflict will ultimately be settled by England's giving Asia to Russia, in order thereby to maintain herself in the rest of the world, India being retained as long as possible under England's care.

But Ratzenhofer looks still farther, and foresees the time when "out of the downfall of Russia and out of the dissolution of the English power into many separate English States, a circle of states embracing the world shall at last arise as the outcome of the increasing dominance of European culture" (II, 249). It may seem that here the author has given too loose reins to his political fancy, but that is not the case. He is only drawing the strong, logical conclusions from his scientifically and firmly established premises in regard to the character of politics.

The investigation of "social policy" (*Gesellschaftspolitik*) forms the last (IV) division of the second volume. "In every state," he says, "there are 'persons' which, under the laws in force, can obtain no power. These persons strive for political power, either by means of revolution or by opposing the existing legal order with the legal powers they possess under that order." Such persons (and here we are thinking of religious and socialist parties) necessarily seek the support of those circles that are outside the state, but have common interests. "This struggle and the conflict, within and without the state, which arises in consequence," is social policy (*Gesellschaftspolitik*) (II, 252). In this section the author discusses in a very

objective and moderate manner the work of the various religious, nationalistic, capitalistic, feudal and communistic (socialistic) societies. At this juncture he speaks at length of the Antisemitic Society, which was called into being by the Jewish Society, in keeping with the eternal and unchangeable law that "every really effective social organization calls forth an opposing one" (II, 263).

After the author has investigated the nature of politics, as carried on both by society and by the state, and in national and foreign affairs, he takes up, in Volume III, the purpose and aims of each of these systems of politics. Throughout the first two volumes a realism prevails that certainly will not escape being considered pessimistic by many though I should by no means make such an indictment. With the very first page of the third volume, however, the author enters upon a somewhat optimistic course of thought, a fact that will conciliate many opponents of the first two volumes. The author thinks he can prove that "the influence of the self-interest of all, taken collectively, upon individual self-interest" is growing with the development of mankind, and that the aim of politics is to "harmonize progressive socialization and individualization, the one a social, the other an individual, necessity." To the extent that politics fulfill this purpose are they civilizing;" following an opposite course will produce "barbarous" politics. "The aim of politics, *i. e.*, civilizing politics, is the commonweal of mankind."

The author is, of course, careful to say that he is speaking only conditionally of the purpose of politics, because "considered as a phenomenon, politics is of itself, without purpose." This assurance is fortunate, for without it we should be compelled to charge him with having a teleological concept of the world. The author seems to appreciate this well, and consequently does not neglect at the outset to surround his statements regarding the purpose of politics with certain restrictions, in order that he may protect himself against every possible accusation, and especially, against the charge of an unwarranted optimism. For the charge of being thus optimistic would be at the door of everyone who claimed that the aim of all politics, domestic and foreign, and the policy as well of all societies, is to secure the maximum welfare of all mankind. The author does not make this claim. Nevertheless he naturally desires not to leave his large temple of thought without harmonious completion; he wishes, so to speak, to crown his structure with a beautiful dome. He has spoken of struggles and conflicts without end; can he, then, tell us nothing of the *possible* conclusion of these as an aim of politics? Not to do so would, perhaps, be more scientific, though less human.

The author does not practice any such cruelty upon his readers. Just as the poet brings his tragedy to a conciliatory close so Ratzenhofer reassures us with a reference to a possible ending of these struggles by the victory of civilization. This is what he terms "practical optimism." However, we will not call him to account for this, because we ourselves accept this humane view. The idea may not be absolutely scientific, but we gladly accept it as a kind of religion of humanity. This practical optimism judges all politics according as they do or do not lead to a higher degree of socialization of men; if they do, then they lessen the "absolute enmity" within the societies that are thus more highly socialized; and there results a harmony of the interests that have previously been in barbarous conflict.

These more socialized societies can in time come to include entire circle of states. In them also the material motives will steadily decline, and the intellectual and moral incentives, those having the common good of all as their goal, will win the upper hand. Under the steady operation of such forces culture develops into civilization, the highest form of morality and science for which we are by nature fitted, a civilization whose characteristic is freedom of thought concerning those secrets of nature that have from the earliest times been the province of religion (III, 24). Of course, we are to-day still very far from such a condition of affairs. To mention but one evidence of this, the author considers "the practical (present) meaning of the aim of civilizing politics" to be the just participation by each person, and thus by the masses, in the conditions of life." Since the idea of civilization requires a continually increasing socialization, the idea is not concerned with the maintenance of "political individuals;" the continuance of political individuals may often prove a hindrance to civilization (III, 88).

The author maintains that the progress of civilization is certain, because it is a natural necessity of mankind. We cannot follow the author thus far. Has he not at this point allowed himself to be too far misled by his "practical optimism?" On the contrary, we will gladly join him in believing in the great progress of the idea of civilization within the states and the larger circles of culture.

We agree with the author that the tendency of races and nations is to unite into political states, for it is a social law that the concept of a nation is becoming constantly more freed from the idea of a common ancestral descent (III, 130). From this standpoint of a necessary process of civilization, which, like a social law, must work itself out in every state with a civilizing influence, the author subjects the several "political interests" existing in a civilized State to a searching criticism. It would lead us too far afield to follow the author into detail

here. Suffice it to say that what he says concerning the interests of the laboring class, of capital and of manufacturers is worthy of note. He considers the basic institutions of the civilized state from the same standpoint also, "and the purposes of the same when carried into the realm of practice." In the last chapter, devoted to the latter theme, he considers the "civilizing administrative system" of the state.

The succeeding chapter on the civilizing foreign politics of the state gives the author an opportunity to investigate public law, and the commercial and colonial policies of modern states.

In the last division of this (III) volume, the author gives a condensed outline of his philosophy of history, under the title of a "Critique of Civilization." He bases his philosophy of history upon the two results of his previous investigations, respectively expressed in the two following sentences: "The nature of politics manifests itself as a struggle of the existing public entities and institutions each for its own advantage" (III, 401). "The aim of politics shows itself to be establishment of a harmony of all interests."

At this juncture the author shows that according as civilization itself is politics developed for the accomplishment of good, so do political methods employed in the civilizing process improve. This consideration is a warning to the state to employ as far as possible only civilizing means. How did Castlereagh's success in bribing the masses and inducing the Irish Parliament to decree its own death profit England? What advantage has it been to Austria to fail to observe the rights by which she and Hungary have been reconciled? (III, 418).

As the state must ultimately place itself in the service of civilization, so must the sciences place themselves in the same position? The natural sciences, however, must form the basis of all sciences, the political and social included, if they are to be justified in having this aim; for civilization itself, as the author asserts in the "Conclusion of the Discussion of Sociology," is "a phenomenon in which the laws of nature obtain." This view demands a conscious and purposive participation of man in civilization. The author calls this view of civilization, and of the duties men have toward it, "the socialistic concept of the world," an expression which may lead to ambiguities and mistakes.

It is perhaps better to designate this concept of the world, the "sociological" rather than the socialistic.* A sociological view of the world for the reason that it can command only the leading thinkers among men, "conceals within itself no social dangers, no exaggeration, as the

* Cf. Gumplowicz: "*Die sociologische Staatsidee*." Graz, 1892. In which the author establishes this "sociological view of the world" in a way similar to that employed by Ratzenhofer.

individualistic does. An aggressive individualism, the leaven of civilization, is ineradicably connected with our political nature, to temper it and rationally to restrict it is the purpose of socialism considered as a world ideal" (*i. e.*, as a sociological view of the world).

The author closes his thoughtful work with these striking words. We have been able to present the content of the book but briefly, to give a detailed estimate of the work would lead us beyond the limits of a review. We think it is not saying too much to assert that this work by Ratzenhofer is an epoch-making one in the world's political literature. The name of its author will henceforth be associated with the most illustrious sociologists and political philosophers, though he may at first expect to meet much opposition from the ranks of the scholars in the faculties of the German universities.

LUDWIG GUMPLOWICZ.

The Repudiation of State Debts. By WILLIAM A. SCOTT, Ph. D. Pp. x, 325. Price \$1.50. Library of Economics and Politics, Number 2. Richard T. Ely, editor. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1893.

The first feature of this book to attract the reviewer's attention is the extensive and painstaking research evinced by it. A vast amount of material has been worked through, much of it consisting of original "sources," though a portion—as in the case of almost any book nowadays—falls rather under the head of "authorities." The author seems, in fact, to have availed himself of most that would serve his purposes with best effect. Nor is it too much to say that the material has been well, and even skillfully handled.

Another merit of this book is the clear and concise style in which it is written. With the exception of a single sentence on page 71, in which the construction of the word "issued" is not clear, there is hardly a line of doubtful meaning.

The author, however, shows in his work a higher quality than that of the careful investigator or the clear writer. His impartial and successful treatment of the sectional question that constantly forces itself into the field of his inquiry, proves that he has the historical insight and broad human sympathy necessary to understand and interpret the phenomena with which he has to deal. His summary of the causes of repudiation in the South is admirable. The work deals with a most important social question, and its value, beyond the purely economic aspects of the case, would be much increased if, in the separate accounts for the various Southern States, the separation was more clearly indicated between the "carpet bag" governments which saddled the States